Public Comment in Response to OPM’s Proposed Rule: “Reduction in Force Appeals” by Tully Rinckey PLLC

OPM’s proposed rule, “Reduction in Force Appeals” (RIN 3206-AO99), makes repeated appeals to the Congressional intent underlying the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). “The federal government’s civil service system,” it begins, “is rooted in principles of merit, fairness, and efficiency” (91 FR 5861). And indeed, the CSRA does aim to balance merit, fairness, and efficiency. However, OPM’s proposed rule does not aim for this balance. Instead, it privileges “efficiency” as not only the primary, but sole guiding principle. It is in the name of “efficiency” that merit and fairness are to be sacrificed.

OPM’s Proposed Rule runs directly contrary to the merit system principles codified in the CSRA. OPM should rescind their proposed rule for the following reasons:

Firstly, Enacting this rule would result in an unacceptable erosion of employee due process rights which OPM has failed to adequately address in this proposal;

Secondly, OPM lacks the authority to claim both policymaking and adjudicative functions for itself; and,

Thirdly, OPM’s stated aim of maximizing efficiency is not only dubious, but actively harmful and at cross purposes with the foundational impetus of the CSRA.

1. OPM Proposes “Efficiency” at the Unacceptable Cost of Employees’ Due Process

OPM neatly summarizes their stated intent behind “Reduction in Force Appeals” (RIN 3206-AO99) thusly: “While employees may lack some procedural mechanisms if appeals are transferred to MSAC as contemplated by this rule, OPM believes streamlining the process will not have a consequential impact upon the substantive outcomes of the appeals, while improving the efficiency and consistency of the process.” 91 FR 5867.

And true: it would surely be more “efficient” for a singular body to serve both the policymaking function and the adjudicative function. Likewise, it is probably efficient for a singular executive to hold all powers in government. But efficiency must not come at the cost of integrity and fairness: a core value which the tripartite structure of our government is designed to reflect.

OPM recognizes this conflict-of-interest concern, and gestures toward a preventative measure: separating the policymaking and adjudicative functions within OPM. RIF appeals will be under the ambit of MSAC to “maintain appropriate administrative separation between its policy arm (WPI) and adjudication arm (MSAC).” 91 FR 5867. OPM fails, however, to assuage all concerns surrounding their proposed consolidation of powers within OPM. The following due process concerns remain:

1. Barriers to appeal, including a disproportional shift of burden onto the employee and curtailing of access to union representation;
2. Reduced transparency and lack of opportunity for discovery of additional evidence from the government;
3. Lack of a guaranteed hearing; and,
4. Foreclosure of additional review outside of OPM.

As it stands, the proposed rule lacks any claim to transparency and accountability. The barriers it would place before employees seeking recourse are unfair and unreasonable.  OPM is not offering “modernization.” It is offering regression. If adopted, the resulting tip of the scales would disadvantage employees so drastically, we are hard-pressed to interpret OPM’s proposal as anything other than another step toward resurrecting the pre-CSRA Civil Service Commission.

Unfair Shift of Burden onto the Employee and Curtailing of Representation Rights

OPM’s proposed § 351.901(b) shifts the burden of proving error in a RIF action onto employees. Bear in mind, this is while OPM maintains sole control over the administrative record. Thereafter, § 351.905(c) as proposed would make OPM the sole arbiter of whether further investigation or a hearing is justified. § 351.907 cements OPM as the sole arbiter of whether or not their own decisions merit reconsideration: judge and jury. Again, the burden of proof falls upon the employee, whose access to the record is controlled by OPM and OPM alone. We are expected to trust OPM to supervise, police, and rein in itself.

The barriers to appeal are doubled by OPM’s proposed § 351.904, which restricts employee representatives. OPM claims “sole and exclusive discretion” to disallow representatives OPM views as presenting a “conflict of interest.” OPM, accountable to no one but itself, would have leave to bar any federal employee from serving in a representative capacity, i.e., as a union representative. § 351.904 is a backdoor attack on union representation rights.

Reduced Transparency and Lack of Opportunity for Discovery of Additional Evidence from the Government

The Trump administration has argued in court that district courts lack jurisdiction over employee claims because the CSRA channels those claims through the statutory scheme; this statutory scheme—i.e., MSPB—they claim, provides adequate review.[1] The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was among those not convinced. While granting that Congress intended the CSRA review scheme to preclude district court jurisdiction, the court points out that Congress also intended the review scheme to provide employees with meaningful and impartial review.

OPM’s proposal to maintain exclusive control over compiling, maintaining, and adjudicating a strictly administrative record would effectively foreclose meaningful review of RIF actions. Meaningful review requires separation between those making a decision from those reviewing it. Given the friction that OPM has encountered while defending RIFs in court, OPM’s proposal to foreclose judicial review is all the more troubling.

For example, the Ninth Circuit responded to the Trump administration’s efforts to claim the CSRA precludes district court jurisdiction:

“The sweep of actions undertaken by the government without ordinary processes—actions which the government now seeks to shield from scrutiny by invoking presumptions ordinarily attendant upon the very processes it has ignored…. [W]e see no reason to insist that the district court remain ignorant of documents that may or may not eventually be included in an administrative record.” AFGE v. Trump, 155 F.4th 1093, slip op. at 23-24 (9th Cir. 2025).

Likewise, a district court (N.D. Cal.) called OPM’s proffered “administrative record” into question. Judge Alsup’s memorandum opinion eloquently states the court’s concern in that case (AFGE v. OPM). It mirrors our concern at OPM’s proposed rule.

Judge Alsup responds to OPM’s claim that the CSRA review scheme provides adequate review thusly:

“The uncertain bounds of the ‘administrative record,’ its retrospective preparation (often after tooth-and-nail litigation of the merits on preliminary relief), the government’s exclusive access to the broader corpus of evidence from which it must winnow ‘the whole record,’ and the uphill battle faced by plaintiffs wishing to challenge that record’s propriety all come together to create opportunities to rig the deck before the cut. The present case is illustrative. The ‘administrative record’ submitted by the government is a sham. It does not facilitate judicial review: It frustrates it.” AFGE v. OPM, No. 3:25-cv-01780-WHA, Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 45 at p. 12 (N.D. Cal. September 12, 2025).

Here, the court alludes to an untenable situation. It is a situation OPM proposes to validate via rulemaking. OPM’s proposed § 351.909(c) would place compiling, assessing, and maintaining the record of RIF actions under the “sole and exclusive discretion” of OPM.

Lack of Guaranteed Hearing

The RIF appeal process laid out in § 351.903 is entirely administrative in nature. In effect, appeals are composed only of Agency and OPM record. § 351.903(d) provides that appellants, their representative (if permitted by OPM), and the Agency may request to inspect OPM’s record. There is no external source of authority nor secondary level of review to ensure the completeness and accuracy of any record OPM chooses to provide. Such assessments of the appropriateness of the record are under the “sole and exclusive discretion of OPM.”

Whether or not granting a hearing would be “necessary and efficient” is, again, under OPM’s “sole and exclusive discretion.” § 351.903(c).

Whether an initial decision of OPM may be reviewed further is, yet again, under OPM’s “sole and exclusive discretion.” § 351.907. Because there is no further level of review, no further opportunity to appeal, the entirety of RIF appeal adjudication is wholly under OPM’s “sole and exclusive discretion.” § 351.909.

Foreclosure of Additional Review Outside of OPM

The government met resistance in the courts when claiming that judicial review is foreclosed to employees subject to a RIF. OPM’s proposed § 351.909 would circumvent the courts by codifying what they had previously argued (unsuccessfully) was plainly evident in the CSRA text: the foreclosure of judicial review for employees subject to a RIF.

OPM’s proposal to shift all adjudicatory functions concerning RIF appeals in itself is an alarming enough erosion of due process rights. Foreclosing the possibility of any external review entirely by denying the courts jurisdiction negates any claim OPM might make to ensuring fairness for employees.

OPM makes its case for “sole and exclusive discretion” in RIF adjudications by distinguishing itself from MSPB; e.g., the fact that it is not “subject to restrictions arising from the lack of a quorum.” 91 FR 5867. This logic bypasses the core of Congress’s aim in restructuring the Civil Service Commission into separate independent bodies: OPM and MSPB. The point of a quorum is to ensure adequate deliberation by multiple parties. What OPM characterizes as another “restriction” of MSPB is an intended feature of Congressional design.

In programming terms, MSPB’s ostensible inefficiency is “a feature, not a bug.” A fair and reasonable adjudicative process involves deliberation by multiple parties, not a singular authority accountable to no one but himself: i.e., the Director of OPM who, per OPM’s proposal, supervises both the policymaking and adjudicative divisions. 91 FR 5871, Fn 67. Put another way: this facet of OPM’s distinction from MSPB is precisely why such appeals are properly housed in MSPB.

2. OPM Lacks the Authority to Subvert the Separation of Powers Principle Underlying the CSRA

It is from the blank spaces between the lines of the CSRA that OPM claims the authority to assume full control over RIF appeals.

“Absent explicit statutory directive,” they argue, “it cannot be presupposed Congress’s intention was for MSPB to be the proper venue to hear RIF appeals for non-SES employees;” and, “the best reading of the statute’s absence of an explicit directive is that Congress intended for the President, through OPM, to retain maximum flexibility to determine the procedures under which a RIF is to be carried out, including which entity is best positioned to serve as the venue for RIF appeals.” (91 FR 5865, emphasis added).

Scattered appeals to both history and Congressional intent alike try to gird this claim to silent authority. They fail to convince, fundamentally misrepresenting the CSRA. The CSRA is not primarily a tool to be wielded by the Executive, unchecked, to govern the federal workforce with maximal efficiency. Congress explicitly designed the CSRA to separate the once monolithic authority of the Civil Service Commission into distinct bodies in order to enact merit system principles.

Over the course of drafting, debating, revising, and ultimately passing the CSRA, Congress returned again and again to the core impetus: one they further codified at the head of the CSRA in the Merit System Principles. “Reduction in Force Appeals” (RIN 3206-AO99) references these foundational principles as: “merit, fairness, and efficiency” (91 FR 5861).

OPM relies upon the following assumptions, both of which bear troubling consequences and merit addressing:

1. The CSRA is vague on the matter of delegating who should have authority and oversight over employee appeals of personnel actions, particularly RIFs; and,
2. Absent explicit statutory language to the contrary, it can be assumed by virtue of said absence that Congress intended the President to wield that power.

It is in the interests of “merit, fairness, and efficiency” that OPM would consolidate and assume sole control over RIF appeals, thereby effectively foreclosing meaningful review for an untold number of employees. Only “efficiency” receives any serious attention.

Moreover, we fear that “fairness” and “merit” are not only neglected in this proposed rule, but actively thwarted: something Congress has not granted OPM the power to do.

A. Regarding OPM’s claim that Congressional intent in the CSRA is ambiguous when it comes to delegating authority over RIF adjudications

Congress’s intent for MSPB in the CSRA is clear: to protect federal employees and merit principles alike as a fair and impartial adjudicating body, independent from Presidential influence.

MSPB’s independence from the President is a key factor distinguishing it from OPM, which is subject to Presidential influence. Thus, OPM’s proposal to assume control over RIF appeals is antithetical to Congressional intent. Congress clearly intended the rule-adjudicating body (MSPB) to be independent of the rule-making body (OPM). This separation of powers is foundational to the CSRA’s reformation of the preceding ineffectual Civil Service Commission.

The CSRA passed only after many discussions and debates in Congress. Given OPM’s appeals to Congress’s intent, the record of said discussions merits attention.

For example, Congressman Udall characterizes the driving intent behind the CSRA thusly:

“…[T]he administration’s overhaul of the civil service system is to break up the system in which the Civil Service Commission used to be both the adjudicator, the judge, and the protector of the integrity of the system and also the personnel manager for the Government.… We have broken these down into separate functions, so that the adjudicators can adjudicate and the managers can manage.”[2]

Reinforcing the point is Congressman Harris’s summary of their bill’s accomplishment:

“[T]his bill and the reorganization plan that Congress approved this past month separates the Civil Service Commission into two parts. It has a Merit System Protection Board, which has the job of protecting the rights of the employees. It has taken the personnel function out of the Civil Service Commission and set it up in another office [OPM].” [3]

Theirs was a fraught task. Arguably, the core challenge in drafting the CSRA was balancing priorities which convention holds in opposition:

Efficiency with fairness.

Protecting employees with reducing costs.

Providing adequate review and due process with an effective civil service.

Most recorded discussions orbited this balance with debate after debate over employee appeals processes. Those arguing for reduced appeal rights pointed to the Commission’s bloated bureaucracy: the need to address “grade creep,” fueled by the sentiment that top positions “maybe ought to go down one notch.”[4] Those arguing for more appeal rights pointed out that a long, drawn-out appeals process had been used by management to stimy employee rights by draining their resources.

Both sides—those privileging fairness and those privileging efficiency—appreciated the importance for both principles. They agreed that federal employees faced with termination are still entitled to their day in court. Not only is it clear the House fully intended employees to have that due process. They believed they had statutorily assured it: “They are entitled to their day in court under the bill.”[5]

One episode is  illustrative. Congressman Harris proposed an amendment to further restrict the conditions under which the head of MSPB could be removed by the President. This would ensure “a clear distinction here between an agency such as the Office of Personnel Management directly under the hand of the President, and an independent board such as the Merit System Protection Board.”[6] They recognized the dangers of Presidential influence over MSPB. To allow for political appointees to govern employee adjudications might “open up, not to this President, but perhaps to some future President the opportunity of putting a fox in charge of the chicken house[.] Should we allow a political appointee to be the one to implement these merit principles that we think are so important?”[7]

The amendment did not pass. Notably, this was not because Congress did not believe the MSPB should be independent from presidential influence. It was because they believed the CSRA already had adequately protected MSPB’s independence from presidential influence. As Congressman Solarz put it, “the Merit System Protection Board is already effectively insulated from Presidential pressure by virtue of the fact that the members of the board are ineligible for reappointment and can only be removed for cause.”[8]

Given both the debates spent fine-tuning the CSRA as well as resultant text of the bill itself, one would be hard pressed to argue, as OPM does in its proposed rule, that: Congress, in drafting the CSRA, intended rule making and adjudication to be consolidated under the sole ambit of OPM.

Jumping forward several decades, the concerns of Congressman Harris and those who voted for his amendment are prescient. President Trump fired Special Counsel Dellinger and two MSPB board members last year. It is in light of this that the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals (NAIJ v. Owen) determined that the district court did have jurisdiction in an employee challenge that, typically, would have been channeled through the CSRA’s statutory review scheme. Judge Berner’s opinion echoed those discussions held on the House floor while drafting the CSRA: “Congress enacted the CSRA on the bedrock principle that the members of the MSPB and the Special Counsel would be protected from removal on political grounds, providing them independence from the president.” NAIJ v. Owen, No. 23-2235, slip op. at 19 (4^th Cir. June 3, 2025).

B. Regarding OPM’s claim that, absent explicit statutory language to the contrary, it can be assumed that the President holds a given power.

The courts have not held that the President can be assumed to hold powers that Congress does not explicitly deny the President in statute. Otherwise, Congress would be obligated to draft statute on every conceivable power imaginable just to ensure the President did not seize it on such sweeping grounds.

Such a situation would surely thwart OPM’s stated aims of maximizing efficiency. But again, efficiency is not, and never should be, the sole consideration in all matters of governance. Nor can any and all powers not specifically accounted for by Congress be seized by the President. The Supreme Court itself has reasserted that fact only very recently.

We would direct you to the Supreme Court’s February 20^th decision holding that IEEPA does not grant President Trump the authority to impose tariffs. In his opinion, Justice Roberts cites a consistent history in which the Court has “long expressed ‘reluctan[ce] to read into ambiguous statutory text’ extraordinary delegations of Congress’s powers.”  Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S.____ (2026), at 7 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.) (quoting West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022); quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 324 (2014)).

Concurring, Justice Gorsuch points out a simple fact. In writing legislation, Congress “cannot anticipate every eventuality”—nor do they need to: because all federal legislative power rests with Congress.[9]

OPM’s proposed rule does not directly concern tariffs, as this decision did. However, at its core, OPM’s proposal demands a consolidation of powers that is not only detrimental to but fundamentally contrary to the CSRA and the governing principle of separation of powers. And, at the heart of the Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump decision, is SCOTUS’s reaffirmation of that very separation of powers principle.

OPM’s efforts to consolidate rulemaking and adjudicative functions under its sole authority would precisely effect the situation these Justices warn of. Or, in Congressman Harris’s colorful terms: OPM is the fox appointed by the President, and the fox proposes to change the rules and charge itself with protecting the chickens in the chicken house.

3. “Inefficiency” as the Bulwark of Liberty

“Efficiency.” “Streamlining.” “Modernization.” These are the refrains with which OPM justifies its proposed rule. Again, efficiency is not—and must not become—the sole principle guiding our federal civil service. Or indeed, any other aspect of governance. There are times, inconvenient though they may seem to sum, that inefficiency is precisely the point.

In his concurrence on Learning Resources, Inc., Justice Gorsuch states the matter well:

“[M]ost major deci­sions affecting the rights and responsibilities of the Ameri­can people (including the duty to pay taxes and tariffs) are funneled through the legislative process for a reason. Yes, legislating can be hard and take time. And, yes, it can be tempting to bypass Congress when some pressing problem arises. But the deliberative nature of the legislative process was the whole point of its design. Through that process, the Nation can tap the combined wisdom of the people’s elected representatives, not just that of one faction or man. There, deliberation tempers impulse, and compromise hammers disagreements into workable solutions. And because laws must earn such broad support to survive the legislative pro­cess, they tend to endure, allowing ordinary people to plan their lives in ways they cannot when the rules shift from day to day. In all, the legislative process helps ensure each of us has a stake in the laws that govern us and in the Na­tion’s future. For some today, the weight of those virtues is apparent. For others, it may not seem so obvious. But if history is any guide, the tables will turn and the day will come when those disappointed by today’s result will appre­ciate the legislative process for the bulwark of liberty it is.” Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S.____ (2026), at 46 (GORSUCH, J., concurring).

Here, Justice Gorsuch’s words echo those of Congressman Harris almost fifty years ago. The Congressman emphasized the CSRA, and the MSPB in particular, as a “bulwark against a President who may want to somehow intrude upon the merit system.”[10]

And yet, OPM claims (91 FR 5867) that Congress not only “intended” but “entrusted” to OPM exclusive authority over RIF actions and appeals. This claim is far from evident in the CSRA. Citations of statutes predating the CSRA, and which the CSRA was designed to replace, are immaterial.

“Reduction in Force Appeals” (RIN 3206-AO99) calls for a sweeping restructuring of employee rights. What OPM is proposing here is a radical consolidation of authority—for itself. A change this significant merits a longer comment period to enable OPM to collect and address concerns from the public.

We request that OPM address the following concerns before proceeding:

By what statutory authority can OPM foreclose judicial review to employees appealing a RIF action?

In recent years, courts have expressed concern that the CSRA is no longer functioning as Congress intended, and thus district courts may have jurisdiction in otherwise channeled employee claims. In response, OPM’s own legal team (e.g., AFGE v. OPM) has argued that the CSRA’s review scheme is exclusive regardless of any alleged dysfunction at MSPB, and the functionality of MSPB at any given time does not justify bypassing the CSRA’s statutory review processes. However, OPM justifies this proposed rule—see “b. The Current, Cumbersome RIF Appeal Procedures Hurt the Federal Government”—in large part by appealing to the dysfunctionality of MSPB (91 FR 5865-7).

If, as OPM has argued, this functionalist view of jurisdiction does not vest district courts with primary jurisdiction in RIF cases, why should it vest OPM with primary jurisdiction in RIF cases?

How would OPM ensure separation between its proposed adjudicative arm and policymaking arm?

We are troubled by the following footnote to OPM’s Statement of Need section (91 FR 5871, Fn 67): “OPM emphasizes the independence of its adjudicative function from its policymaking function. It further notes that both the independent policymaking function and adjudicative function are under the supervision of the Director of OPM. As head of the agency, he is uniquely positioned to understand the intent and substance of the RIF process rules, which he can leverage to ensure they are properly effectuated. MSPB personnel lack such a perspective.”

Again, the fact that MSPB lacks “the perspective” of the policymaking function is precisely why Congress designated MSPB with the adjudicative function. A foundational impetus underlying the CSRA was the separation of what had been a singular Commission into separate, independent bodies: one for policymaking, one for adjudicating.

Presumably, OPM recognizes the potential conflict of interest here. Otherwise, why would there be any effort to separate the two functions in OPM? And yet, OPM emphasizes that both (ostensibly separate) functions report to the same person: the Director of OPM. Under OPM’s proposed rule, will the Director of OPM maintain separation between his supervision of the policymaking function and adjudicative function? If so, how will he maintain that separation? And, who will be in charge of determining whether he is or is not maintaining adequate separation between OPM’s two conflicting functions?

How would including data from the 2025 RIFs enacted by the present administration affect OPM’s provided cost-benefit analysis?

In its cost assessment, OPM projects “considerable savings to the American taxpayer.” These calculations draw upon RIF data from 1995 to present day—“excluding the anomalously large number of RIFs from 2025.” 91 FR 5872, Fn. 70; emphasis added.

Given that the body currently proposing to assume full control over RIF appeals (OPM) is the same body charged with carrying out the 2025 RIFs excluded from this cost-benefit analysis (OPM), the “anomalous” nature of said RIFs is not sufficient reason to exclude them. Point of fact, it is all the more reason to feature that data. If the American taxpayer is expected to front the costs of OPM’s project to maximize efficiency in RIF appeals, the American taxpayer is entitled to know how much the 2025 RIF appeals—which constitute actual and not merely projected data—cost.

Is a 30-day comment period sufficient time for all affected parties to adequately study and respond to the proposed rule?

“Reduction in Force Appeals” (RIN 3206-AO99) is one of multiple rules proposed by OPM at this time: rules which already follow upon previous rule changes by OPM and further complicate any assessment of the present rule(s). An extended comment period is appropriate. We suggest a 90-day comment period to consider the current proposed rules in the larger context of changes to other areas, including: suitability determinations, ratings policy changes, schedule policy/career conversion appeals, and collective bargaining agreements.

As attorneys who have had the privilege of representing thousands of federal employees, we hold those who dedicate themselves to federal civil service in the highest regard. We also recognize that working in the federal civil service is a privilege. But to have a nonpartisan civil service governed by principles of efficiency and fairness and merit is not a privilege: it is a right of the American taxpayers who fund the federal government.

Access to independent review and appeal opportunities are paramount to ensuring that right is met. Restricting employees’ avenues for recourse to the “sole and exclusive discretion” of a singular executive agency—one accountable to no one but its own Director and the President who appointed him—does injustice to both federal employees and the people they serve. Due process should not be restricted to those employees who can afford professional legal representation to wage lawfare on their behalf for indeterminate lengths of time. Merit principles demand, for all federal employees faced with termination, equal access to their “day in court.”[11]

Tully Rinckey PLLC

March 11, 2026

 

[1] See NAIJ v. Neal (E.D. Va. 2023), AFGE v. OPM (D. Mass. 2024), as well as the Trump administration’s application for stay to SCOTUS which hinges on the fixedness of Congressional intent for the CSRA and its review scheme. Margolin v. NAIJ, No. 25A662, slip op. at 20 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2025) (Application for Stay).

[2] House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (1979), p. 875.

[3] Congressman Harris, arguing for an amendment to further cement MSPB’s independence from the president; see House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (1979), p. 870.

[4] House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (1979), p. 881.

[5] For example, see the exchange in which Congressman Hadley spoke for an amendment adding additional appeals protections for employees thusly: “It certainly is not my intent to encourage continued employment of incompetent people, but I do feel that that individual should certainly be entitled to his or her day in court,” to which Congressman Derwinski emphasized, “They are entitled to their day in court under this bill.” House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (1979), pp. 869-871.

[6] House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (1979), p. 881.

[7] House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (1979), p. 860.

[8] House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (1979), p. 883.

[9] “Article I vests all federal legislative power in Congress. But like any written instrument, federal legislation cannot an­ticipate every eventuality, a point my concurring colleagues have observed in the past. Id., at 781–782. And highly re­sourceful members of the executive branch have strong in­centives to exploit any doubt in Congress’s past work to as­sume new power for themselves.” Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S.____ (2026), at 16 (GORSUCH, J., concurring).

[10] House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (1979), p. 882.

[11] “It certainly is not my intent to encourage continued employment of incompetent people, but I do feel that that individual should certainly be entitled to his or her day in court,” to which Congressman Derwinski emphasized, “They are entitled to their day in court under this bill.” House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (1979), pp. 869-871.