In the context of eligibility for access to classified information, Guideline B, Foreign Influence is one (1) of the thirteen (13) Adjudicative criteria established by Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (SEAD 4). Security adjudicators use these guidelines to determine if an individual’s foreign ties or preferences pose a risk to national security.

Guideline B focuses on whether an individual has foreign contacts or interests that could create a conflict of interest or make them vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure. The Concern is focused on the primary risk of divided allegiance. Foreign contacts—including family, friends, or business associates—might result in an individual being manipulated by foreign intelligence services to act against U.S. interests.

Red Flags under Guideline B: Foreign Influence

One’s foreign contacts can be used to leverage one into betraying the Republic to an “Enemy of the State.” And it is not up to the applicant or employee to decide whether they can be leveraged. Doing so identifies the applicant or employee as willing to place themselves in the role of Security, which is a security concern in and of itself, under Guideline E, Personal Conduct.

You need to prepare your own, personal security file to respond to Security should the way your personal life is set up present a security concern to the United States. This includes circumstances wherein one:

• Has immediate family members who are citizens or residents of a foreign country;
• Shares living quarters with individuals creating the potential for foreign influence or duress;
• Fails to report contacts with a foreign national; or,
• Has financial interests in a foreign country or foreign-owned business.

There are means to mitigate such security concerns, but it is important to remember that the applicant or employee bears the burden of clearing their name (no pun intended) once a red flag goes up. Far better to proactively manage one’s personal life and deny Security the opportunity to red flag your file, than to do little or nothing and face the road of hiring counsel and battling through an 18-to-24 month adjudication that could end in loss of your clearance (and perhaps pay check) for a year and a day.

Mitigating Guideline B, Foreign Influence

Though most adjudication programs do not issue their decisions, both the Energy Department and the Defense Department post non-precedential decisions which nonetheless provide examples of “Guideline thinking” for Guideline B, Foreign Influences.

Example 1

On April 10, 2025, Judge Robert R. Gales found mitigation for an applicant under Guideline B. Applicant’s mother-in-law, ex-girlfriend, and one child (the child of Applicant and his ex-girlfriend) were residents of Kyrgyzstan. The child was a dual U.S. – Kyrgyzstan citizen and the others were Kyrgyzstan citizens. The spouse was a Kyrgyzstan citizen residing in Ecuador with the applicant, and their two children, awaiting the naturalization process to become a U.S. citizen. The Applicant’s contacts with his mother-in-law, ex-girlfriend, and his child were solely manifestations of his or his wife’s care and concern for relatives residing in Kyrgyzstan.

For comparison, the Applicant provided evidence of deeper, consistent relationships in the United States. His wife, two children, parents, sister, and mother-in-law were all citizens and residents of the United States. The Applicant owned property and was financially invested in the United States. He was trusted in his employment and was an involved member of his community. All this he proved.

Judge Gales provided further instruction for would-be applicants and holders challenged by Security and facing the loss of their employment. In assessing whether there is a heightened risk because of an Applicant’s relatives or friends in a foreign country, it is necessary to consider all relevant factors, including the totality of an applicant’s conduct and circumstances, and the realistic potential for exploitation.

One such factor is the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress. In that regard, it is important to consider the character of the foreign power in question, including the government and entities controlled by the government, within the relevant foreign country. Nothing in Guideline B suggests it is limited to countries that are hostile to the United States. In fact, one must avoid reliance on overly simplistic distinctions between “friendly” nations and “hostile” nations when adjudicating cases under Guideline B. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is drastically higher with an authoritarian government.

Example 2

We have a second example of successful Guideline B, Foreign Influence mitigation. Judge Philip J. Katauskas issued a decision granting a clearance on June 20, 2022 relating to foreign influence and fornication with citizens of another country. The Applicant for a clearance mitigated concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence even though he fornicated with several women in a different country during his service in the United States Army. The pertinent activity was spread over two decades. It seemed significant that the sex acts were done via masturbation in combination with electronic transmissions. In exchange, the applicant paid the five women a total of $66,900. He did have physical sex with one woman.

The countries involved also seemed important —notably the Philippines and the United Kingdom —both of which previously shared a colonial relationship with the United States. The applicant proved he had ceased contact with the sex workers in or around 2022 and had not re-initiated contact. There was no evidence that any of the Applicant’s foreign friends ever served in the Philippines’ or any other foreign countries’ military, government, or intelligence services. The Federal government will determine this, and then not give the applicant or employee the information collected.

So, beware: commit a sex act with a foreign national, and you are having “security sex” with everyone in his or her link analysis to the third degree of separation.

It will have been important that the sex workers were thought by the judge to lack knowledge of the Applicant’s pursuit of security clearance. The Applicant proved he was never solicited by these sex workers for information considered classified, sensitive, or proprietary in nature. He also proved he had developed no preference or feelings of sympathy, loyalty and/or allegiance to the Philippines nor any other foreign government, interest, individual and/or entity as a result of his foreign friends. Additionally, the financial aid was proved to not present a heightened risk of exploitation by either foreign entity.

Closing Considerations for Guideline B Mitigation

When assessing the degree of risk posed by one’s foreign contacts or interests, the existence of some manner of relationship with a foreign national is not the only point of consideration. Other relevant factors include:

The nature of the foreign nation in question: How likely is this foreign power to leverage coercion, duress, or manipulation against someone in the Applicant’s position? Foreign pressure campaigns require at least two: one to be coerced, and another to apply pressure.

The extent of the Applicant’s domestic ties, interests, and relationships: Is the Applicant tethered more firmly to the U.S. than any other nation? Some examples of potentially mitigating ties include: owning property, having American children, and extensive community involvement.

The whole person in context: How plausible would it be for the Applicant to forsake their life and relationships in the U.S., never to return? Or be otherwise vulnerable to coercion? Is the Applicant trustworthy, reliable, and of sound judgment?

Risk assessment is not only a matter of the Applicant’s conduct and character, but a realistic evaluation of the surrounding context. That context need not be within the Applicant’s control for it to tip the scales when U.S. national security is at stake.

Dan Meyer, Esq. is a Partner at Tully Rinckey PLLC’s Washington, D.C. office and has dedicated more than 25 years of service to the field of Federal Employment and National Security law as both a practicing attorney and federal investigator and senior executive. He is a lead in advocating for service members, Federal civilian employees, and contractors as they fight to retain their credentialing, suitability and security clearances.

Tully Rinckey attorneys understand that issues involving security clearances can be challenging, and they will handle your matter with the attention and tact it deserves. If you have additional questions, our team of dedicated security clearance attorneys is available to assist you today. Please call 8885294543, or schedule a consultation online.